Scope of Section 245 CrPC and Magistrate's Power to Discharge Detailed Analysis
In a recent and detailed ruling, the Madras High Court has clarified the scope of Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, particularly the Magistrate’s power to discharge an accused under Section 245(2). The case offers an important judicial interpretation on when discharge can take place in warrant cases initiated otherwise than on a police report. This blog walks through the legal background, the key takeaways from the judgment, and its implications.
Understanding Section 245 CrPC
Section 245 deals with the discharge of the accused in warrant cases based on private complaints. It contains two key provisions:
Section 245(1) mandates discharge after recording evidence, if the Magistrate concludes that no case is made out that would warrant conviction.
Section 245(2) provides discretionary power to the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case, if the charge appears to be groundless.
While the language of Section 245(2) is broad, the Madras High Court has provided essential clarification on what constitutes a "previous stage" and when this power can be validly exercised.
Facts of the Case and Judicial Reasoning
In The Assistant Commissioner of Customs vs. S. Ganesa (Crl.R.C.No.372 of 2022), a discharge order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Special Court Customs, was challenged. The offence involved carried a maximum punishment of seven years, making Section 245 applicable.
Justice D. Bharatha Chakravarthy, presiding over the single-judge bench, observed that the application for discharge was premature, as it was filed even before the complaint was taken on file.
While Section 245(2) refers to “any previous stage of the case,” the Court clarified that this stage must be post-cognizance, and cannot include the "check and call on" stage — a procedural point where the complaint is simply scrutinized for formal completeness.
The Court emphasized that Section 245(2) cannot be stretched to a point where the Magistrate has not yet taken authoritative notice of the allegations in the complaint. Therefore, until cognizance is taken and the complaint is properly filed (e.g., numbered and sworn statements recorded), there is no scope for a valid discharge.
Key Legal Question: When Does a “Case” Begin Under Section 245(2)?
The Court framed a crucial legal issue:
Does the phrase “at any previous stage of the case” include even the presentation and ‘check and call on’ stage of the complaint, when no cognizance has been taken and proceedings under Section 200 CrPC have not commenced?
Referring to Ajoy Kumar Ghose vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2009), the Court examined how the Supreme Court had interpreted “any previous stage of the case” to mean a post-cognizance stage, starting from Section 200 CrPC — when the Magistrate takes cognizance and may either issue process or postpone it by ordering an inquiry under Section 202.
The Court also cited Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia vs. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel (2012) to reinforce that cognizance implies some authoritative consideration of the allegations, even if formal steps like numbering or recording of sworn statements are still pending.
What the Madras High Court Held
In this particular case, the complaint was simply adjourned with the notation "check and call on" — no authoritative notice of the complaint had yet been taken by the Magistrate. Hence, the Court ruled:
The stage under Section 200 CrPC had not commenced.
There was no application of judicial mind to the complaint's substance.
Thus, the application for discharge was premature and not maintainable under Section 245(2).
The High Court reiterated that “at any previous stage of the case” must refer to a stage after the Magistrate has taken cognizance, not merely the mechanical act of complaint submission or scrutiny for defects.
Conclusion
This decision provides a much-needed clarification on the interpretation of Section 245 CrPC. The judgment reinforces that while Section 245(2) gives the Magistrate discretion to discharge an accused early in the proceedings, this power arises only after cognizance is taken — not before.
The ruling helps avoid misuse of procedural stages by either party and ensures that Magistrates apply their discharge powers with judicial discipline, not at a stage where the complaint hasn't even been formally examined.
This judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the procedural fairness enshrined in criminal law, and an important precedent for cases where early discharge is sought.
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